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Abstract
National saving rates di⁄er enormously across developed countries. But these dif-
ferences obscure a common trend, namely a dramatic decline over time. France and
Italy, for example, saved over 17 percent of national income in 1970, but less than 7
percent in 2006. Japan saved 30 percent in 1970, but only 8 percent in 2006. And
the U.S. saved 9 percent in 1970, but only 2 percent in 2006. What explains these
international and intertemporal di⁄erences? Is it demographics, government spending,
productivity growth or preferences? Our answer is preferences. Developed societies
are placing increasing weight on the welfare of those currently alive, particularly con-
temporaneous older generations. This conclusion emerges from estimating two models
in which society makes consumption and labor supply decisions in light of uncertainty
over future government spending, productivity, and social preferences. The two models
di⁄er in terms of the nature of preference uncertainty and the extent to which current
society can control future societies￿spending and labor supply decisions.
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11 Introduction
National saving rates di⁄er enormously across developed countries. But these di⁄erences
mask a common trend, namely a dramatic decline over time. Table 1 documents this
phenomenon. It shows national saving rates for the U.S., Japan, U.K., France, Italy, Spain,
and Canada for selected years from 1970 through 2006. With the exception of Canada, each
country￿ s saving rate plummeted over this period. France, for example, saved 17.3 percent
of national income in 1970. In 2006 it saved only 6.6 percent. Italy saved 17.4 percent of
its income in 1970, but only 4.2 percent rate in 2006. And the U.S. saved at 9.5 percent of
its income in 1970, but almost nothing in 2006.
What explains these di⁄erences across countries and over time? Is it changes in de-
mographics, preferences, government spending or economic conditions? To address this
question, we estimate a model in which the government and household sector jointly make
labor supply and consumption decisions. This societal decision-making framework is mo-
tivated by Green and Kotliko⁄￿ s (2006) demonstration that economic models with rational
agents draw no distinction between private and public property. Instead, the government
and household sectors e⁄ectively play the role of two people stranded on an island, each
of whom can claim, via "o¢ cial," "legal," or informal proclamation, to own all or part of
the island￿ s resources, including his own and the other party￿ s time. But such claims have
no economic basis or import. What each person ends up consuming in goods and leisure
depends on fundamental factors, including the ability to threaten and cajole.
Our one-good, closed-economy model assumes that the government and the public (so-
ciety) resolve their con￿ icts and capitalize on their opportunities by agreeing to maximize a
social welfare function. This function equals the expected discounted ￿ ow of utility from the
public￿ s future consumption and leisure. Each period￿ s consumption and leisure decisions
are made in light of uncertain future levels of productivity and government spending as well
as uncertain future social preferences.
We model social preference-uncertainty in two ways. In model 1, current society is in
2charge forever. It knows its current intertemporal preferences (rate of time preference) and
current intratemporal preferences (relative weighting of di⁄erent age groups￿utilities from
consumption and leisure). What it doesn￿ t know is its future intertemporal preferences (how
its rate of time preference will evolve). Model 2 is a time-inconsistency variant of model 1.
Rather than posit a single society that is in charge forever, we permit the society in charge
to change each period. Although each society knows for sure its future preferences, each
society realizes that it can control future social consumption and leisure allocation decisions
only indirectly via the amount of capital it leaves behind.
We use the method of moments to estimate the two models for the U.S., France, and Italy.
All six sets of results point to the same culprit for the declines in national rates of saving,
namely changing social preferences that place ever greater weight on current generations
relative to future generations.
1.1 Model 1: Uncertain Future Preferences
The economy￿ s single good is produced via
Yt = ZtK
￿
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where ￿ is capital share in production, At = (1+￿)At￿1 captures labor-augmenting technical
progress, occurring at rate ￿; Zt is time-t multifactor productivity, ea is the earning ability
(e¢ ciency units) of an individual age a, and Pa;t counts the population age a at time t. Each
individual has one unit of time available each period.
The economy￿ s capital stock, K, evolves according to
Kt+1 = (1 ￿ d)Kt + ZtK
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where d is the depreciation rate, ca;t and na;t are the consumption and labor supply of age-a
3agents at time t, and gt is the level of government spending scaled by the level of labor-
augmenting technical progress. The term ea captures the earnings ability (e¢ ciency units)
of age-a workers. This term is zero for workers under age 15 and over age 75; otherwise, ea
satis￿es1
ea = e
4:47+0:0033￿(a￿15)￿0:000067￿(a￿15)2
: (3)
Multifactor productivity, Zt, and scale government spending, gt, deviate around stationary
long-term values according to the following
lnZt = ￿Z lnZt￿1 + "t;with "t ￿ N(0;￿
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Society cares about the utility from consumption and leisure of those agents now alive and
those yet to be born. At any point in time, the weight applied to contemporaneous agents￿
utilities in the social welfare function depends on their ages. Current consumption and
labor supply decisions are made in light of uncertainty about future productivity, government
spending and rates of time preference.
Society￿ s expected utility at time t is
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where the ￿a parameters are the aforementioned utility weights, the function u(:;:) is assumed
to be of addilog form:2
u(c;n) =
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1 ￿ ￿
; (7)
1For further details see Fehr et al. (2007).
2For further details see Maliar and Maliar (2001). We measure labor supply as the share of each year
spent working.
4and ￿s is the time-s discount factor. Society knows ￿t, but is uncertain about future values
of ￿s for s > t. Because today￿ s society controls all future allocations, the issue here is
one of uncertain future desires, not changing decision makers; i.e., the problem here involves
preference uncertainty, not time inconsistency. The discount factor obeys
ln￿t = (1 ￿ ￿￿)ln￿ + ￿￿ ln￿t￿1 + ￿t with ￿t ￿ N(0;￿
2
￿t): (8)
As with Zt and gt, the ￿t follows an autoregressive progress that ￿ uctuates around a long-
run stationary value, and its lagged value represents another state variable. Finally, utility
weights are modeled via a third-order polynomial, i.e.,
￿a = ￿0 + ￿1 ￿ age + ￿2 ￿ age
2 + ￿3 ￿ age
3: (9)
Society￿ s solves the following program:
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subject to (2). Optimality requires
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where rt and wt are time-t marginal products of capital and labor.
We solve this and the other model via backward induction taking 2100 as the terminal
year. Using a later terminus makes little di⁄erence to parameter estimates. Expectations
are calculated using Gaussian quadrature.
5The key parameters of interest are the initial (1950) value of ￿, the rate ￿￿, which
determines ￿
0s convergence, on average, to its long-run value, and the long-run value of ￿; ￿.
An initial value for ￿ that lies signi￿cantly above ￿, coupled with fast convergence (a value of
￿￿ close to 0) is indicative of society placing less weight over time on future consumption and
leisure when deciding how much to consume and how much leisure to enjoy in the present.
1.2 Model 2: Time-Inconsistent and Uncertain Future Prefer-
ences
In this model, today￿ s society has stable preferences and knows, therefore, how it now values
and will value future consumption and leisure allocations. But it doesn￿ t directly control
future allocations. Instead, each period￿ s allocations are made by the prevailing society (the
decision makers in charge in the period at hand) based on time-preference rates that will
generally di⁄er from those of current society. The precise levels of such future time-preference
factors are unknown to current society. But current society knows that these preference
factors will evolve according to (8). It also knows that its sole manner of in￿ uencing future
allocations is via the amount of capital it transmits to the next society, which, in turn,
in￿ uences what the next society will leave to the following society, and so on.
Formally, each society selects an allocation strategy taking the strategies of other societies
as given. This strategy is a map from the state rt = ft;Zt;gt;￿t;Ktg to the choice variables
fca;t;na;tg for a 2 [0;::;100]. The ￿xed point in the strategy space, which guarantees that
all strategies are optimal given the strategies of the other players, is a Nash equilibrium.
Time-t society chooses fca;t;na;tg for all a 2 [0;::;100] to maximize
Wt =
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6subject to (2) and conditional on its state variables rt. Note that c￿
a;t+￿(rt+￿) and
n￿
a;t+￿(rt+￿) denote the optimal choice that the time-(t + ￿) future society will make con-
tingent on the prevailing state variables rt+￿.
We also solve this problem recursively, starting at date T. First we work out the society
Ts allocation decisions as functions of the state variables in the last period, rT. Next,
we determine society (T ￿ 1)￿ s allocation decisions as functions of rT￿1. In making its
decisions, the (T ￿ 1) society considers not only its welfare from period (T ￿ 1) allocations,
which it directly controls, but also the expected value of its future welfare (discounted using
its own time-preference rate) from period T decisions made by society T. The (T ￿ 2)
society has a similar problem to that of the (T ￿ 1) society except that it must consider how
two future societies will allocate consumption and leisure and so on.
We use Monte Carlo simulations to determine how a society prevailing at time s makes
its decisions. Speci￿cally, for given state variables at time s;rs, and each candidate time-
s allocation (consumption and leisure choices), we form the average of current and future
realized utility outcomes generated by the simulations to determine how much expected
utility the candidate allocation generates. The allocation with the highest expected utility
constitutes the optimal time-s decision. The Monte Carlo simulations entail taking draws
of future paths of time-preference rates, productivity levels, and levels of scaled government
consumption and using the previously determined allocation decisions of future societies to
determine the consumption and leisure values that will be chosen along any path. As with
model 1, we assess a shift in social time preference in terms of the degree to which the
long-run value of ￿ lies below its initial value as well as the speed at which societal time
preference converges, on average, to its long-run value.
2 Data
Our U.S. data consists of a) 1950-2004 annual National Income and Product Account chain-
weighted observations of GDP, private consumption, domestic investment, and government
7discretionary spending, b) annual U.S. Census counts of population by age for 1950-2004, and
c) U.S. Census projections of population by single age for 2005-2100. Our French and Italian
macro data for 1950 through 2004 come from the Penn World Tables. These countries￿single-
age demographic data were derived from special tabulations of the 2006 release of United
Nations￿ s World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision. The UN projects populations
only through 2050. We employed a fourth-order polynomial in interpolating from our 1950-
2050 data to form single-age population counts from 2051 through 2100.3
3 Estimation
To limit the number of parameters to be estimated, we assume a 5 percent annual rate of
depreciation. We normalize the 1950 values of Z and, following an example discussed by
Zhao, Dutkowsky, and Dunsky (1999), we set b at 1. Our 1950 value of K comes from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis￿series on ￿xed reproducible tangible wealth.4 Rather
than jointly estimate the persistence coe¢ cient ￿g and standard deviation ￿t for government
expenditure in (5) together with other model parameters, we obtain estimates of these pa-
rameters from a VAR(1) of total government expenditure adjusted for labour-augmenting
technical progress.5 The U.S. data for our VAR(1)s come from U.S. National Income and
Product Accounts.6 The date for France and Italy come from the Penn World Tables.7
3Given the data points, the aim of polynomial interpolation is to ￿nd the polynomial that ￿ts exactly
through these points. In practice, we generated the fourth order polynomial in time for the 1950-2050
period. We further used the estimated polynomial coe¢ cients to obtain the single-age projected counts of
population.
4The net foreign asset position was obtained by substracting the foreign investments in the coun-
try from the investments abroad. For the U.S., data was obtained from Bureau of Economic Analy-
sis (http://www.bea.gov/international/xls/intinv05_t2.xls and BEA archive records), while for France and
Italy, since no data were available, we interpolated within the grid for capital in order to obtain the U.S.
correspondent initial capital point for these countries.
5We obtained adjusted government expenditure by simply dividing the total amount of government spend-
ing at time t by (1 + ￿)t.
6http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb, Tables 3.9.3 and 3.9.6.
7http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/.
8We use the Simulated Method of Moments (SMM)8, to estimate the parameters
￿0 =
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:
We estimate the parameters of the discount-factor process conditional on ten di⁄erent
assumed initial (1950) values of ￿ and choose the one that generates the data for which SMM
results best ￿t their empirical counterparts. We choose this method of estimating the initial
value of ￿ for the following reason. As indicated, the current value of ￿ is a continuous
state variable. But in running our dynamic program, we limit our grid for ￿ to ten possible
values ranging from 1 to 10 possible values. Were we instead to attempt to estimate ￿ for
1950 along with other parameters in ￿0, we would surely compute a value di⁄erent from that
on our grid, i.e., treating ￿ as a continuous, rather than discrete, unknown parameter would
be inconsistent with the assumptions underlying the dynamic program used to calculate ￿.
Table 3 lists our choice of moments.
In implementing SMM, we simulate N = 20 paths of the economy and collect for each
path the simulated values of each variable.9 We compute the set of moments conditional on
the initial values of the state variables r0 and on the parameters ￿0 and minimize JT ￿the
weighted sum of squared deviations of simulated moments from their empirical counterparts:
JT = argmin
e ￿
[mT ￿
1
N
mN(r0;￿0)]
0W[mT ￿
1
N
mN(r0;￿0)]; (15)
where mT represents data moments and mN(r0;￿0) is the set of moments of each of the
N simulated paths of the arti￿cial economy. W is the weighting or distance matrix that
almost surely converges to W = S￿1 , where S is the limit, as NT ! 1, of the constant
full-rank matrix of the covariance of the estimation errors.10
8See McFadden, 1989 and Pakes and Pollard, 1989).
9Using more paths than 20 to compute moments didn￿ t change results materially.
10As described in Andrews (1991), an optimal weighting matrix is obtained as the inverse of the variance-
covariance matrix of the moment conditions evaluated at a set of ￿rst-step estimates, in which W is set
equal to the identity matrix. This matrix is consistently estimated using the estimator proposed by Newey
9For a given number N of path, as T ! 1, if the weighting matrix W is chosen optimally,
then
T[mT ￿
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2(j ￿ k);
where j is the number of moments and k is the number of estimated parameters.
4 Findings
Tables 4 - 6 present, for each country, the two models￿simulated moments together with
their empirical counterparts. A quick glance shows that the simulated and actual moments
are very close. Statistically, the goodness of ￿t between the two series is assessed by a ￿2
test or the corresponding p-value. Each model easily passes the ￿2-test, with ￿2 values well
below the 5 percent critical value of 5.991. The p-value here references the probability of
rejecting the hypothesis that the actual and simulated moment are equal when they are,
indeed, equal. So a higher probability means the test is more reliable. Based on the p-
values, model 1 provides a slightly more reliable ￿t for the U.S., whereas model 2 provides
a slightly more reliable ￿t for France. For Italy, model 1 provides a much more reliable ￿t
than does model 2.
The fact that our two models generate such similar results for the U.S. and France
suggests that it￿ s very hard to say from U.S. and French time series data whether their
societies su⁄er from time-inconsistent decision making. For Italy, model 1￿ s much better ￿t
represents evidence in favor of time-consistent decision making.
Tables 7 - 9 present parameter estimates. Generally speaking, the estimates are econom-
ically reasonable and remarkably similar across models and countries. Take model 2. The
estimates for ￿ (the consumption elasticity of substitution) are 1.96 for the U.S., 2.46 for
France, and 2.07 for Italy; the respective country-speci￿c estimates for ￿ (the leisure elastic-
and West (1994), which places more weight on moments that are more precisely estimated. Implementing
this method entails ￿tting the moments of the simulated series to their real data counterparts under the
condition of W = I and then using estimates from this stage to form the weighting matrix W = S￿1 for use
in a second and ￿nal stage estimation of (15).
10ity of substitution ) are 5.79, 4.91, and 5.75; the estimates of ￿ (the rate of labor-augmenting
technical change) are close to 2 percent for all three countries; the respective estimates of ￿
(capital￿ s share) are 0.29, 0.31, and 0.31; the respective estimates of ￿Z (the autoregressive
coe¢ cient for multifactor productivity) are 1.25, 1.23, and 1.18.11
Figures 1 and 2 plot model 1￿ s and 2￿ s respective age-speci￿c utility weights for each
country. As expected, the weights rise with age through middle age for all countries and for
both models. For the U.S. and Italy, the pro￿les then head south (apart from an increase at
very old ages in Italy￿ s model 2). For France, the weights continue to rise with age in model
1; in model 2, the weights peak and then start to rise again around age 85. These larger
utility weights at older ages may re￿ ect social preferences toward providing the elderly with
expensive age-related health care services. Or they may simply re￿ ect the inability of our
estimating procedure to closely pin down the value of the cubic coe¢ cient in the polynomial
used to capture the age-weight relationship. Another point of interest are the shapes of the
age-weight pro￿les for the three countries. They suggest that French and Italian societies
place relatively more weight on the well being of the elderly than does American society.
Tables 7 - 9 address our main question: Has social time-discounting or age-weighting
changed over time in each country in ways that help explain observed declines in the three
countries￿national saving rates? The answer is yes, with time-discounting playing the key
role. As these tables indicate, the initial discount fact, ￿0, exceeds its long-run value, ￿, for
each country. Hence, over time, each country places less and less weight on the well being
of those coming in the future.12 The di⁄erences between ￿0 and ￿ may seem small, but
they can be substantial when translated into time preference rates. For U.S., the long-run
11Note that a value above 1 is to be expected given that we are have not detrended the data.
12Note that the values of ￿0 and ￿ both exceed 1. Given that the model we are estimating has a ￿nite
horizon (year 2100), this presents no problem with respect to an explosive value of the expected utility
maximand. Furthermore, given secular growth in consumption, we would expect a discount factor above 1.
As discussed in Jonsson and Klein (1996) and Cooley and Prescott (1995), a discount factor in excess of 1
can be consistent with long-run secular growth and in￿nite horizon utility. One simply needs to normalize
the model for labor-augmenting technical change and note that the normalized discount factor is less than
1; i.e., that the normalized model has a ￿nite maximand. Instead of adopting this approach, we preferred
to estimate the labor-augmenting technical change rate as a parameter.
11time preference rate is 36.1 percent higher than its initial (1950) value for both models. For
France, the long-run increase in time preference rates is 9.2 percent in the case of model 1
and 9.0 percent in the case of model 2. For Italy, there￿ s a 54.0 percent rise in the time
preference rate based on model 1 and a 8.2 percent increase based on model 2.
This shift toward present-orientation in￿ uences national saving. Tables 10 - 12 show
actual and simulated saving rates for each country under models 1 and 2. The rows labeled
"baseline" refer to the saving rates generated by the two models. The fixed ￿ row shows
how each country￿ s saving rate would have evolved had the discount factor remained at its
1950 level. In both the baseline and ￿xed-￿ simulations, we start in 1950 and run our
models forward setting all error terms to zero. In the U.S., the simulated national saving
rates are very similar for both models and accord fairly well with actual rates for 1970, 1990,
and 2000. For 1980, the simulated saving rates under each model are much lower than the
observed rate. Given that we are assuming no shocks to the economy in the simulations,
we wouldn￿ t expect a close relationship between actual and simulated rates in all years. In
the case of France, the two models￿baseline simulated saving rates are also in fairly close
agreement, although they do less well than in the case of the U.S. in predicting observed
saving rates. For Italy, the two baselines saving rate paths di⁄er considerably with neither
matching observed saving rates very closely.
According to both models, saving rates would have been either substantially or dramati-
cally higher had American, French, and Italian societies not become so focused on immediate
grati￿cation. The U.S. saving rate is more than twice as large in 2000 with a ￿xed ￿ than
it is with a declining ￿, which is the baseline case. Under model 2, the year-2000 ￿xed-￿
saving rate is almost 50 percent larger than the declining-￿ rate. For France, model 1￿ s
￿xed-￿ simulation produces a year-2000 rate of saving that￿ s almost 80 percent higher than
the baseline value. This di⁄erential ￿gure is just over 60 percent higher in model 2. For
Italy, model 1 generates a year-2000 saving rate that￿ s more than one third higher when ￿
stays ￿xed; model 2 generates a year-2000 rate that￿ s over three times as large!
12One response to these ￿ndings is that estimating a declining ￿ was virtually guaranteed
given that we￿ re ￿tting declining national saving rates and that a declining value of ￿ can
easily track this. Our response is that we aren￿ t ￿tting the saving rates per se. Instead,
we￿ re ￿tting the second moments listed in Table 3. In addition, there are other factors in the
model that might have explained the decline in national saving rates, producing estimates
of ￿ above those for ￿0. These include the countries￿changing demographics, trends in
government spending, trends in multifactor productivity growth and the interactions of these
trends with the levels of the utility-function parameters and other model parameters.
5 Conclusions
National saving rates have been declining dramatically in developed countries in recent
decades. This paper estimates two models for the U.S., France, and Italy, with both
models featuring uncertain future rates of social time-preference. In one model, current
social decision makers remain in charge over time. The second model incorporates time-
inconsistency under which current social decision makers can only indirectly in￿ uence future
social decision makers via the amount of capital they leave for their successors.
Parameter estimates from both models show that shifts in societal preferences, which
have placed ever greater weight on immediate grati￿cation, are the principal reason that the
U.S., France, and Italy are saving at much lower rates now than they did in the past. Of
course, most future consumption and leisure will be done by future generations. Hence, our
results are, in part, indicative of growing intergenerational sel￿shness.
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15TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1. National saving rate for selected years
Rate (%) 1970 1980 1990 2000 2006
U:S: 9.5 8.6 4.8 6.8 2.1
France 17.3 11.2 9.7 10.5 6.6
Italy 17.4 12.7 8.3 7.1 4.2
Japan 30.5 20.7 20.4 9.6 7.8
Spain 15.9 9.2 10.9 10.1 7.6
Germany 19.7 9.5 12.8 6.2 9.8
U:K: 14.0 5.7 3.6 4.2 4.5
Canada 12.0 12.3 6.2 12.7 12.5
Source: World Economic Outlook Database, International Monetary Fund, April 2007
Table 2. Government Spending Parameters
V AR(1) Parameters ￿g ￿t
United States 0:6386 0:0343
France 0:9112 0:0422
Italy 0:9464 0:0348
Table 3. Choice of Moments
￿ln(Yt); ￿ln(Ct); ￿ln(It);
￿ln(Ct=Yt); corr(Yt;Ct); corr(Yt;It);
corr(Ct;It); corr(Yt;Yt￿1); corr(Yt;Yt￿2);
corr(Ct;Ct￿1); corr(It;It￿1); corr(Ct=Yt;Ct￿1=Yt￿1);
corr(Ct;Ct￿2); corr(It;It￿2); corr(Ct=Yt;Ct￿2=Yt￿2)
16Table 4 Estimated Moments and Goodness of Fit Test, U.S.
Moments Model 1 Model 2 Empirical
￿ln(Yt) 0:430 0:430 0:534
￿ln(Ct) 0:499 0:499 0:571
￿ln(It) 0:568 0:566 0:612
￿ln(Ct=Yt) 0:102 0:103 0:040
corr(Y t;Ct) 0:992 0:992 0:999
corr(Y t;It) 0:972 0:973 0:985
corr(Ct;It) 0:966 0:966 0:980
corr(Y t;Y t￿1) 0:997 0:996 0:999
corr(Y t;Y t￿2) 0:995 0:995 0:998
corr(Ct;Ct￿1) 0:999 0:999 0:999
corr(Ct;Ct￿2) 0:999 0:999 0:998
corr(It;It￿1) 0:975 0:976 0:989
corr(It;It￿2) 0:963 0:965 0:975
corr
0
B B
B
@
Ct=Yt;
Ct￿1=Yt￿1
1
C C
C
A
0:875 0:868 0:947
corr
0
B B B
@
Ct=Yt;
Ct￿2=Yt￿2
1
C C C
A
0:800 0:796 0:901
JT 0:037 0:039
￿2(2);5% 2:062 2:194
p ￿ value 0:356 0:333
17Table 5 Estimated Moments and Goodness of Fit Test, France
Moments Model 1 Model 2 Empirical
￿ln(Yt) 0:474 0:481 0:565
￿ln(Ct) 0:546 0:557 0:543
￿ln(It) 0:670 0:684 0:634
￿ln(Ct=Yt) 0:094 0:092 0:035
corr(Y t;Ct) 0:985 0:991 0:998
corr(Y t;It) 0:998 0:998 0:983
corr(Ct;It) 0:977 0:986 0:985
corr(Y t;Y t￿1) 0:996 0:997 0:998
corr(Y t;Y t￿2) 0:994 0:995 0:995
corr(Ct;Ct￿1) 0:999 0:999 0:999
corr(Ct;Ct￿2) 0:999 0:999 0:998
corr(It;It￿1) 0:995 0:995 0:991
corr(It;It￿2) 0:992 0:992 0:979
corr
0
B B
B
@
Ct=Yt;
Ct￿1=Yt￿1
1
C C
C
A
0:895 0:896 0:908
corr
0
B B B
@
Ct=Yt;
Ct￿2=Yt￿2
1
C C C
A
0:823 0:813 0:821
JT 0:0137 0:0133
￿2(2);5% 0:753 0:731
p ￿ value 0:686 0:694
18Table 6 Estimated Moments and Goodness of Fit Test, Italy
Moments Model 1 Model 2 Empirical
￿ln(Yt) 0:506 0:449 0:580
￿ln(Ct) 0:632 0:561 0:619
￿ln(It) 0:542 0:622 0:502
￿ln(Ct=Yt) 0:143 0:125 0:057
corr(Y t;Ct) 0:991 0:987 0:998
corr(Y t;It) 0:983 0:999 0:981
corr(Ct;It) 0:951 0:981 0:969
corr(Y t;Y t￿1) 0:997 0:996 0:998
corr(Y t;Y t￿2) 0:994 0:994 0:995
corr(Ct;Ct￿1) 0:999 0:999 0:999
corr(Ct;Ct￿2) 0:999 0:999 0:997
corr(It;It￿1) 0:979 0:994 0:985
corr(It;It￿2) 0:961 0:990 0:971
corr
0
B B
B
@
Ct=Yt;
Ct￿1=Yt￿1
1
C C
C
A
0:950 0:944 0:945
corr
0
B B B
@
Ct=Yt;
Ct￿2=Yt￿2
1
C C C
A
0:904 0:906 0:882
JT 0:015 0:041
￿2(2);5% 0:857 2:260
p ￿ value 0:651 0:323
19Table 7 Parameter Estimates, U.S.
Parameter Model 1 Model 2
￿ 1:928 1:961
￿ 5:474 5:787
￿0 0:983 0:983
￿ 0:977 0:977
￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ 0:909 0:901
￿￿t 0:001 0:001
￿ 0:289 0:292
￿Z 1:267 1:250
￿"t 0:033 0:035
￿ 0:021 0:021
￿0 0:519 0:518
￿1 0:102 0:097
￿2 ￿0:197 ￿0:194
￿3 0:100 0:098
20Table 8 Parameter Estimates, France
Parameter Model 1 Model 2
￿ 2:501 2:461
￿ 5:117 4:910
￿0 1:062 1:064
￿ 1:056 1:058
￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ 0:643 0:867
￿￿t 0:002 0:002
￿ 0:332 0:314
￿Z 1:240 1:234
￿"t 0:036 0:029
￿ 0:022 0:024
￿0 0:529 0:494
￿1 0:102 0:097
￿2 ￿0:146 ￿0:192
￿3 0:104 0:106
21Table 9 Parameter Estimates, Italy
Parameter Model 1 Model 2
￿ 1:272 2:075
￿ 0:509 5:755
￿0 1:022 1:069
￿ 1:010 1:063
￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ 0:813 0:885
￿￿t 0:003 0:002
￿ 0:291 0:307
￿Z 1:027 1:181
￿"t 0:026 0:035
￿ 0:032 0:022
￿0 0:687 0:506
￿1 0:120 0:097
￿2 ￿0:112 ￿0:190
￿3 0:030 0:099
22Table 10 Saving Rates, U.S.
Saving Rate (%) 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Actual ￿ ￿ 9:53 8:58 4:81 6:81
Model 1 baseline 24:79 7:36 8:38 2:59 4:01 5:02
Model 1 fixed ￿ 25:26 16:55 9:34 9:15 5:98 11:28
Model 2 baseline 25:22 7:63 8:68 2:95 4:47 5:88
Model 2 fixed ￿ 25:44 16:68 9:43 9:46 6:47 8:73
Table 11 Saving Rates, France
Saving Rate (%) 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Actual ￿ ￿ 17:31 11:16 9:67 10:46
Model 1 baseline 10:06 13:00 18:36 19:53 17:11 10:49
Model 1 fixed ￿ 18:56 30:53 36:22 35:29 31:20 18:85
Model 2 baseline 12:31 10:17 16:54 17:53 16:92 11:84
Model 2 fixed ￿ 19:45 27:67 33:23 33:30 30:20 18:99
23Table 12 Saving Rates, Italy
Saving Rate (%) 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Actual ￿ ￿ 17:43 12:65 8:27 7:02
Model 1 baseline 19:02 10:68 7:98 8:05 10:12 7:73
Model 1 fixed ￿ 22:93 24:89 26:06 27:35 23:96 10:38
Model 2 baseline 13:96 17:90 19:14 15:94 15:30 7:14
Model 2 fixed ￿ 23:32 34:72 36:43 35:62 31:80 22:16
Figure 1 Model 1 Age-Weights Figure 2 Model 2 Age-Weights
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